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Abstract 
 
Casting A Crime Net, Catching Immigrants:  
An Analysis of Secure Communities’ Effects on the Size of Foreign-
Born Mexican Populations  
 
Carmen Marie Gutierrez, M.A. 
The University of Texas at Austin, 2013 
 
Supervisor:  David Kirk 
 
Following the precedent decision to expand the power of immigration enforcement set by 
the Immigration and Nationality Act Section 287(g), the Department of Homeland 
Security developed its own partnership agreement with local police to increase detection 
and deportation efforts through its 2008 policy, Secure Communities (S-Comm). S-
Comm represents the nation’s “largest expansion of local involvement in immigration 
enforcement in the nation’s history” (Cox & Miles 2013, pg. 93). Although slated to 
enhance public safety by removing “criminal aliens” convicted of serious offenses, S-
Comm has broaden its scope to achieve attrition in the undocumented immigrant 
population more generally by also focusing on the removal of those who violate low-
level and immigration laws, as well as those who have recently entered the U.S. illegally. 
Its implementation and enforcement procedures, however, have been found to 
disproportionately target foreign-born Mexican residents relative to other undocumented 
 v 
individuals, which may lead to negative consequences for S-Comm’s efficacy. Has S-
Comm effectively reduced the size of the Mexican immigrant population in the U.S.? 
Exploiting the variation in the timing of its implementation as well as the disparate levels 
of its enforcement, my research extends a quasi-experimental design to investigate S-
Comm’s effect on the size of local Mexican immigrant populations. Testing the influence 
of S-Comm’s implementation and enforcement will reveal the salience of passing laws 
that target unauthorized migration—an empirical contribution to previous work that has 
only assessed state and local policies. Moreover, such results may also enhance 
theoretical knowledge of punitive practices formulated to produce deterrence.   
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 1 
Introduction 
With over one billion dollars budgeted to identify and deport “illegal aliens,” the 
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) transformed immigration enforcement with the 
nation’s newest and vastest policy, Secure Communities (S-Comm). Since its 2008 
inception, S-Comm has become activated in all U.S. counties and represents “the largest 
expansion of local involvement in immigration enforcement in the nation’s history” (Cox 
& Miles 2013, pg. 93). S-Comm mandates information sharing between local police 
departments and DHS’s Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) agency in order to 
streamline the detention and deportation of undocumented residents (DHS 2013). Slated 
to enhance public safety by removing “criminal aliens” convicted of serious offenses, S-
Comm authorizes local law enforcement agents to check the immigration status of every 
arrestee taken into custody—generally before those persons received any conviction or 
even trial (Kohli, et al. 2011). As a result, most of those removed by the S-Comm 
program have been largely law-abiding.1  Though such deportations appear contrary to its 
stated purpose, Director of ICE, John Morton, recently explained that the program also 
seeks to reduce the overall unauthorized immigrant population by focusing on the 
removal of those who have “repeatedly violated our immigration laws, or have recently 
entered the United States” (DHS 2012), in addition to individuals who pose risks to 
public safety. While confusion regarding its scope has inspired recent attention and 
investigation concerning S-Comm’s wavering efficacy, the extent to which S-Comm 
                                                 
1 Only 25% of those removed by the S-Comm program have been charged with or convicted of an 
aggravated felony, whereas over 30% of all those removed experienced unlawful contact due to low level 
offenses such as traffic violations or civil infractions (DHS 2013). 
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achieves its purpose of decreasing the undocumented immigrant population in the U.S. 
remains uncertain. Has S-Comm led to reductions in the size of unauthorized residents 
living in the U.S.? 
Designed to achieve ‘attrition through enforcement,’ S-Comm aims to reduce the 
unauthorized population by increasing immigrants’ risks associated with undocumented 
residency—leading to voluntary deportation—as well as intensifying their probability of 
facing detection—resulting in forced removal (Vaughan 2006). Previous studies on the 
effects of similar laws, however, have largely reported that such immigration policies do 
not deter unauthorized migration or reduce the size of the undocumented population (but 
see Chalfin 2013). Moreover, other factors unrelated to the threat or sanctions of 
deportation have been found to predict the likelihood of unauthorized migration. For 
example, the manner by which immigration policy is perceived by immigrants and 
carried out by enforcers greatly influences undocumented residents’ propensities to obey 
those laws (see Ryo 2013). Such findings present a potential threat to S-Comm’s efficacy 
due to a recent report suggesting the program could lead to racial profiling practices. Cox 
and Miles (2013) discovered that DHS prioritized S-Comm’s activation in areas not with 
high rates of crime, but in regions densely populated with foreign-born and non-citizen 
Latinos. During the first 18 months of S-Comm’s rollout (October 2008 - April 2010), 
activated counties were geographically scattered throughout particular areas of the U.S., 
suggesting that those counties were chosen carefully and deliberately (hereafter “high 
priority”). Counties activated in the latter timeline of the rollout (May 2010 - 2013), 
however, were more likely to receive S-Comm as the result of an entire statewide 
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adoption (hereafter “low priority”). The authors conclude that the rollout strategy 
reflected an ethnically disparate impact. 
If S-Comm’s prioritized activation process results in either perceived or actual 
ethnic profiling among Latinos, they may become more likely to enter the U.S. illegally 
and those already residing in the U.S. may become less likely to self-deport since 
negative perceptions of the law and its enforcers weakens individuals’ likelihood for legal 
compliance (Tyler 2002; Ryo 2013), thereby diminishing S-Comm’s ability to achieve 
attrition in the unauthorized immigrant population. Thus, I extend S-Comm’s activation 
dichotomy to test the effects of its prioritized implementation on the number of Mexican 
immigrants across U.S. counties. Mexican immigrants represent a critical group for 
analysis not only because of their disproportionately large share of the overall 
unauthorized population in the U.S., but also due to their distinctly received scrutiny as 
demonstrated through S-Comm deportations. In 2010, though Mexican immigrants made 
up an estimated 58% of the undocumented population in the U.S., they represented nearly 
three-quarters of all unauthorized removals (Lopez, et al. 2011). Accordingly, in addition 
to evaluating its implementation, I also aim to investigate S-Comm’s enforcement on the 
Mexican immigrant population by measuring the number of its county-level deportations. 
The categorically unique attention and disparate treatment received among foreign-born 
Mexicans in regards to immigration policy deem them well suited to examine S-Comm’s 
implementation and enforcement. Moreover, a focus on the effect of prioritization 
elucidates greater information on areas that were strategically enforced by DHS, leading 
to salient policy implications. S-Comm’s effect within high priority counties is also 
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important to understand since such communities largely represent traditional settlement 
destinations for Latino immigrants, and thus my results may advance existing 
demographic literature on Latino immigrants’ changing settlement patterns (Fairchild & 
Simpson 2004; Frey 2002, 2006; Saenz 2004; Suro & Tafoya 2005; Massey 2008; 
McConnell 2008; Vásquez, et al. 2008).  
Exploiting the variation in the timing of its implementation as well as the 
disparate levels of its enforcement, my research extends a quasi-experimental design to 
investigate the efficacy of the nation’s most widespread immigration policy, Secure 
Communities (S-Comm). I employ a first difference approach within ordinary least 
squares (OLS) regression to assess the following questions: (1) Has S-Comm’s 
prioritized implementation led to disparate changes in the Mexican immigrant population 
across high and low priority jurisdictions? Specifically, have high priority counties 
experienced greater reductions in the number of their foreign-born Mexican immigrants 
within a county relative to low priority jurisdictions? (2) Is S-Comm’s enforcement 
associated with changes in the number of Mexican immigrants? Particularly, are 
reductions in the size of the Mexican immigrant population positively associated with the 
number of deportations within a county? Lastly, (3) are high priority areas that 
demonstrate high levels of enforcement uniquely predictive of attrition in the size of 
Mexican immigrants?  
I hypothesize that Mexican immigrants will respond negatively to S-Comm’s 
prioritized implementation and targeted deportation efforts and subsequently relocate 
away from areas where they feel highly scrutinized. Therefore, I predict that high priority 
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counties will experience greater reductions in the number of their foreign-born Mexican 
population relative to low priority counties due to the unique attention and resources 
dedicated to prioritized areas. Although I expect that implementation will lead to 
reductions in the number of local Mexican immigrants, I anticipate that deportation 
enforcement will have a greater influence on the size of foreign-born Mexican residents 
within a county than mere high priority activation. I thus hypothesize that the level of S-
Comm enforcement will be significantly negatively correlated with the number of local 
Mexican immigrant residents, and that this effect will mediate such reductions achieved 
through high priority implementation. Finally, I expect that highly prioritized and 
enforced areas will demonstrate the largest reductions in the size of their Mexican 
immigrant population relative to low priority and lesser enforcing counties.  
By completing one of the first thorough evaluations of S-Comm’s efficacy, I hope 
to not only contribute to previous research on the changing settlement patterns among 
Latinos as well as the precarious effects of immigration policy on unauthorized 
populations, but also to advance theoretical knowledge on the consequences of 
immigrants’ perceptions of legal policy and procedure more generally.  
I begin this paper by providing a brief history of immigration laws preceding S-
Comm and go onto present this policy’s broadening aims, implementation process, and 
procedures. I then review previous research on legal compliance, deterrence, public 
perceptions of the law, and legal cynicism, as well as demographic literature on 
international migration in order to synthesize these separate yet complementary bodies of 
work. Next, I introduce my data, measures, and methodology. I then present my results 
 6 
and describe my findings. Lastly, I discuss the broader theoretical and policy implications 
uncovered by my results and suggest areas and techniques for future related 
investigations. 
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Background 
The chief procedure broadening the net to catch undocumented residents is the 
allocation of immigration enforcement duties from federal to state and local officials. 
Since the 1996 Immigration and Nationality Act’s Section 287(g) [287(g)] precedent 
decision to expand the power of immigration enforcement, local police officers began to 
receive training from federal officials to identify, process, and detain suspected 
undocumented immigrants for subsequent deportation (Tsankov & Martin 2010). 
Although intended as a widespread effort, 287(g) became activated within only 39 local 
law enforcement agencies in 19 states. Frustrated with the national deficit of 287(g) a few 
states implemented their own strategies to increase immigration enforcement.2 While a 
handful of states provide examples of local efforts to expand deportation, Arizona and 
Alabama represent the first and strictest measures respectively. 
Named the nation’s “toughest bill on illegal immigration,” Arizona’s State Bill 
1070 (SB 1070) exemplifies the trend toward draconian immigration enforcement (New 
York Times 2010). Arizona passed SB 1070 in 2010, requiring all unauthorized 
individuals over the age of 14 to register with the Federal Government if their stay in the 
U.S. was longer than 30 days and to subsequently possess their registration documents at 
all times. Undocumented individuals caught without their documents received a criminal 
misdemeanor charge and consequently faced deportation. Furthermore, state and local 
law enforcement agents were required to determine one’s immigration status during 
                                                 
2 States such as Alabama, Arizona, Georgia, Indiana, South Carolina, and Utah passed laws that transfer 
power from federal authorities to local police for immigration enforcement. 
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unlawful acts or lawful contact if there was suspicion that the individual was 
undocumented, which additionally increased the detection and deportation of 
unauthorized residents. 
Alabama ratified comparable legislation in September 2011 with its House Bill 56 
(HB 56), requiring similar detection efforts from its local law enforcement agents to 
determine citizenship status among those suspected of illegal residency. Surpassing SB 
1070’s harsh measures (Los Angeles Times 2011) HB 56 also prohibits unauthorized 
residents from receiving any social assistance benefits or attending public colleges or 
universities. HB 56 also mandates unauthorized elementary, middle, and high school 
students to register as undocumented, and orders public schools to share their lists of 
undocumented students with state and federal agencies. Though SB 1070 and HB 56 have 
been met with vehement disproval, legal challenges, and appeals, both bills remain active 
to some degree and continue to place economic and social burdens on individuals and 
businesses involving both unauthorized residents and citizens (Arrocha 2011; Addy 
2012).  
Recognizing local areas’ efforts and inclinations, DHS created its own partnership 
agreement between ICE and local police departments with its S-Comm policy. Similar to 
its state bill counterparts, S-Comm requires local police to check the immigration status 
of every arrestee in their custody and detain those suspected of being undocumented until 
ICE determines their residency. Though S-Comm does not require many of the additional 
strict measures applied in Arizona or Alabama, it boasts national coverage and casts a 
wide net on unauthorized residents, despite its original stated priority to deport 
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immigrants who pose a threat to public safety. Responding to requests for transparency 
and clarification of intentions from the Homeland Security Advisory Council, ICE 
Director Morton released a taskforce report addressing the recommendations for S-
Comm’s operations. Indeed, Morton clarifies that although “ICE’s highest priority is 
aliens [sic] who pose a danger to national security or a risk to public safety...ICE also 
prioritizes recent illegal entrants, individuals who have repeatedly violated immigration 
laws, and aliens who are fugitives” (DHS 2012). Required to categorize deportees’ level 
of offenses, S-Comm includes any unlawful act punishable by less than one year of jail 
time as part of its prioritized enforcement in order to include civil immigration law 
violators and those charged with or convicted of misdemeanors and other minor offenses 
including traffic laws. Other S-Comm advocates have made public statements to 
elucidate S-Comm’s intentions, including Jessica Vaughan, the Director of Policy Studies 
for the Center of Immigration Studies. In her 2012 interview with FOX News in 
Massachusetts, Vaughan stated that ICE “oversold the idea that they will go after violent 
criminals.” She also adds, “Violent criminals are the priority; they’re not the only target, 
though.”  
Broadening their scope to ostensibly include every immigrant whose residency is 
unauthorized, S-Comm’s efforts should presumably lead to attrition in the size of the 
nation’s unauthorized immigrant population through its widespread punitive and 
deterrence framework. Consequently, both the implementation and enforcement of S-
Comm should reduce the number of Mexican immigrants across local communities in 
part due to the upsurge of deportations (i.e., enforcement) but also as a result of 
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undocumented residents’ heightened propensities to emigrate to their countries of origin 
due to S-Comm’s pervasive efforts for their detection and ultimate removal (i.e., 
implementation). However, our existing knowledge of S-Comm’s relationship with the 
number of Mexican immigrants living in the U.S. remains unclear. Furthermore, 
theoretical assumptions regarding immigrants’ legal noncompliance with negatively 
perceived laws and those that practice racial and ethnic profiling threaten S-Comm’s 
efficacy.  
Though previous studies on state and local immigration legislations’ ability to 
reduce the undocumented immigrant population have produced mixed results (Bean, et 
al. 1990; Kossoudji 1992; Espenshade 1994; 1995; Cornelius & Salehyan 2007; Addy 
2012; Parrado 2013; Ryo 2013), S-Comm’s ubiquitous implementation and widespread 
enforcement offers the first extensive opportunity to unveil U.S. immigration policy’s 
national efficacy—particularly opportune while the rate of unauthorized immigration 
remains stagnant.3 Stagnant rates of immigration permit a more accurate interpretation of 
the effects of immigration policy, since migration flows remain relatively unchanging. 
Testing S-Comm’s influence on the Mexican immigrant population will reveal whether 
immigration policy results in attrition of the unauthorized immigrant population, or if 
such laws remain ineffective at high economic and social costs. 
 
                                                 
3 The Pew Hispanic Center reports that the unauthorized immigrant population in the U.S. has continuously 
and significantly waned by about one million persons after growing 43% between 2000 and 2007, reaching 
a peak size of 12 million (Pew Hispanic Center 2011). Furthermore, the Pew Hispanic Center estimates that 
Mexican net migration, which accounts for about 60% of all unauthorized migration to the U.S., dropped to 
zero after topping its highest levels in 2007  (Passel, et al. 2013). 
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Literature Review 
Expanding power, resources, and authority for immigration enforcement reflects a 
systematic attempt to increase the certainty and severity of punishment for unauthorized 
migration. As the nation’s most extensive effort to involve local authorities in the 
detection of undocumented immigrants, S-Comm relies on the ubiquitous threat and 
enforcement of deportation to generate attrition. While designed to reduce the 
undocumented immigrant population, previous studies on the effects of similar laws as 
well as theoretical contributions that predict reactions to and compliance with such 
policies offer a variety of possible population outcomes. I will review existing research 
and theories to illustrate S-Comm’s potential effects on the nation’s Mexican immigrant 
population including: population gain, no population change, and population loss.  
Population Gain Effect  
S-Comm’s ethnically targeted activations and disparate deportation efforts could 
lead to negative perceptions of this law among Mexican immigrants resulting in 
population growths, especially within high priority areas as well as those that carry out a 
great deal of enforcement.  Contemporary theories predicting lawfulness rest on positive 
perceptions of legal institutions and officials. For example, Tyler (2002) found that legal 
authorities greatly influence the public’s assessments and judgments of the law and its 
legitimacy, which, in turn, predicts the likelihood of compliance with the law. 
Consequently, when individuals experience or perceive unfair treatment from legal 
authorities, their propensity to cooperate with and follow the law diminishes (ibid). This 
process, however, is not unique to individuals; it is also cultural (Kirk & Papachristos 
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2011). Through social interaction, negative experiences with the law become part of the 
neighborhood milieu. Such perceptions permeate in the form of legal cynicism to other 
individuals in that community regardless of whether or not they had any direct negative 
experiences with legal authorities (ibid). Applying these theoretical contributions to 
immigrant groups, Kirk and colleagues (2012) found that immigrant communities are 
generally more cooperative with and less cynical of the law than native-born 
communities. However, trends toward localized immigration enforcement may 
undermine the positive views of the law currently found in immigrant communities with 
consequences for immigration policy defiance. 
For example, Ryo (2013) demonstrates that migrants rationalize their illegal entry 
because they perceive the U.S. federal immigration system as illegitimate. Utilizing 
survey data collected through the Mexican Migration Project (MMP), Ryo found that net 
of socioeconomic and demographic characteristics, individuals’ perceptions of procedural 
justice greatly influenced their deference of the U.S. immigration system. Accordingly, 
undocumented residents’ negative sentiments toward immigration law explain their 
disobedience. The most salient variable predicting Mexican immigrants’ perceptions of 
U.S. immigration policy and its enforcers was the belief that immigration services treat 
immigrants with lighter skin better than Mexicans. Relatedly, many legal studies have 
established that racial profiling practices attenuate positive perceptions of legal 
authorities and diminish their legitimacy to the public (see Tyler 2002), ultimately 
decreasing targeted racial and ethnic minorities’ cooperation with and compliance of the 
law. Consequently, if Mexican immigrants feel unfairly and ethnically targeted by S-
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Comm’s prioritized implementation and disparate enforcement efforts, high priority areas 
as well as those that carry out a great deal of enforcement could experience growth in the 
size of their foreign-born Mexican population.   
No Population Effect 
Alternatively, S-Comm’s implementation and enforcement could demonstrate no 
change on the Mexican immigrant population. Prioritization and deportation could show 
no significant relationship with the number of foreign-born Mexican residents while other 
variables typically associated with migration within demographic literature, such as 
economic conditions and employment opportunities, could maintain their predictive force 
on the migration flows of Mexican immigrants. For example, as the leading economic 
concept within international migration, neoclassical theory suggests that individuals 
weigh migratory decisions based on a cost-benefit analysis. Under neoclassical theory, 
migrants are expected to settle in destinations where they may maximize their economic 
wages, which often results in movement from low- to high-wage countries reflecting an 
imbalance in the international supply and demand for labor (Sjaastad 1962; Todaro 1976; 
Borjas 1999).  Subsequent economics models such as dual labor market and world 
systems theory further explain how such instabilities in the supply and demand for 
products generates a secondary employment sector characterized by low-skill, low-wage, 
and high-turnover occupations. Such capricious job opportunities typically attract 
unauthorized immigrants who are willing to work without formal pay or benefits earned 
in the formal economy (Wallerstein 1974; Piore 1979).  
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Applying traditional theories to undocumented migration from Mexico to the U.S. 
explains that individuals are likely to migrate if they expect that their earning potential 
outweighs the risks associated with their illegal entry, including facing apprehension at 
the border or eventual deportation. Some researchers have employed economic theories 
to test the efficacy of immigration policy for understanding undocumented residents’ 
illegal migration, and most results support the idea that economic gains outweigh the 
risks for unauthorized migration. For example, utilizing time-series data on 
apprehensions made at the U.S.-Mexico border, Espenshade (1994) found that U.S. 
border control policies have been ineffective in reducing or deterring unauthorized 
migration. Examining its deterrence technique for stemming unauthorized migration, 
Espenshade uncovered that increasing the barriers for crossing the border has not 
discouraged illegal entry. Rather, undocumented individuals adapt more clandestine 
strategies and increasingly dangerous entry points to avoid apprehension (Espenshade 
1994; 1995; Cornelius & Salehyan 2007). Furthermore, migrants from Mexico have been 
shown to almost always make repeated attempts at reentry to the U.S. until they achieve 
successful entrance (Bean, et al. 1990; Kossoudji 1992; Cornelius & Salehyan 2007).  
Testing the particular effects of immigration legislation passed in 2006 that 
introduced heightened surveillance, advances in monitoring technologies, and integrated 
fencing at the U.S.-Mexican border, Cornelius and Salehyan (2007) conclude that such 
efforts to stem unauthorized immigration by deterrence is largely ineffective. The authors 
use survey data from recent returnees and potential future migrants collected in rural 
Mexico and found that undocumented immigrants’ motivation for illegal entry was 
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significantly related with their perceived economic opportunities offered in the United 
States. The survey results also indicated that undocumented immigrants’ aspirations to 
improve the lives of their families dwarfed the potential dangers associated with their 
unauthorized residency.  
In one of the latest investigations of deterrent-based immigration policy, Parrado 
(2013) revealed a similar scenario of ineffective outcomes in his evaluation of the 
locally-activated federal immigration program 287(g). In his recent analysis on the effect 
of participating in the 287(g) partnership agreement, Parrado (2013) found little support 
that the program led to any changes in the size of local Mexican immigrant populations.  
The author found instead that shifts in the labor market demand for low-skilled jobs had a 
salient association with the number of Mexican immigrants across local areas. Although 
Parrado found little overall support for 287(g)’s efficacy, he identified a few outlier 
metropolitan areas (Phoenix, Los Angeles, Riverside, and Dallas) that experienced 
reductions in the size of their Mexican immigrant populations. Parrado explains that the 
outliers represent jurisdictions where officials strongly enforced 287(g), and proposes 
that only those locations that executed extreme measures effectively achieved attrition 
(ibid). 
Population Loss Effect 
Although previous studies examining U.S. immigration policies’ capacity to 
reduce the undocumented immigrant population largely report unsuccessful results, 
descriptive evidence from Arizona’s SB 1070 and Alabama’s HB 56 provide a glimpse 
into how the expansion of immigration enforcement has impacted unauthorized 
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immigrants’ exodus. Arizona experienced a 23% reduction in their undocumented 
immigrant population only one year after SB 1070’s activation. The number of 
unauthorized immigrants in Arizona declined from 470,000 in 2010 to 360,000 in 2011 
(DHS 2011). Alabama’s HB 56 likewise produced mass emigration among the state’s 
unauthorized residents. An estimated 80,000 unauthorized immigrant workers (Addy 
2012) and more than 5% of Alabama’s Latino public school students went missing after 
the law went into effect on September 28, 2011 (The Department of Education 2011). 
Fox News (2011) reports “…scores of immigrant families have withdrawn their children 
from classes or kept them home this week, afraid that sending the kids to school would 
draw attention from authorities.” Fearful of deportation or familial separation, residents 
willingly fled places like Arizona and Alabama without facing direct contact with 
authorities.  
Evidence from SB 1070 and HB 56 that correlates the mere implementation of 
punitive deterrent polices with attrition in the number of undocumented residents, 
however, is limited since the effects of SB 1070 and HB 56 were not rigorously tested. 
Moreover, such population reductions could be mere reflections of initial policy shock. 
Laws receiving extensive public and media attention often generate immediate but not 
sustainable changes. For example, the 1986 passage of the Immigration Reform and 
Control Act (IRCA), which posed similar restrictions on unauthorized immigrants in 
order to stem illegal migration, demonstrated a successful effect on reducing the flow of 
unauthorized Mexican migration for only one year (Donato et al. 1992). Forthcoming 
work, however, supports descriptive evidence from DHS regarding SB 1070’s influence 
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on foreign-born Mexican emigration. Employing a differences-in-differences approach, 
Chaflin (2013) found that Arizona’s SB 1070 was strongly associated with reductions in 
the state’s foreign-born Mexican population. While the law showed no effect among 
other foreign-born groups or native-born Latinos, estimates from the American 
Community Survey show that the foreign-born Mexican population declined by nearly 
20%.   
As suggested by Parrado (2013) and supported by descriptive and robust 
evidence, the operative strategy for decreasing the unauthorized immigrant population 
appears to involve stringent measures and strong enforcement. However, although 
Parrado posits that uniquely tough enforcement was associated with reductions in the size 
of the Mexican immigrant populations in areas that participated in 287(g), his 
justification for naming such outliers vigorous enforcers only reflects anecdotal evidence 
and local reputations. No empirical measure was used to capture variance in the level of 
deportations carried out across jurisdictions. Likewise, while Chalfin (2013) found strong 
evidence for enduring reductions in the Mexican immigrant population in Arizona 
associated with SB 1070, his analysis lacked enforcement reports. Offering measures of 
both implementation and enforcement, S-Comm embodies a unique opportunity to 
examine immigration policy’s effect on reducing undocumented populations. 
Furthermore, while previous research has reported mixed results on U.S. immigration 
policies’ ability to effectively thwart unauthorized migration, such findings only reflect a 
small number of laws implemented within non-generalizable state and local jurisdictions. 
S-Comm provides researchers rich data to investigate its efficacy as well as the chance to 
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enhance theoretical models explaining unauthorized migration patterns and 
undocumented residents’ legal compliance with nationwide generalizability.  
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Current Study 
Utilizing county-level data on the timing of S-Comm activation and the number of 
subsequent deportations, this research tests the effects of both policy implementation and 
tangible enforcement on the size of local Mexican immigrant populations in order to 
elucidate whether S-Comm has met its primary aim of reducing the number of 
unauthorized residents living in the U.S. Testing the influence of S-Comm activation will 
reveal the salience of passing laws that target unauthorized migration—an empirical 
contribution to previous work that has only assessed state and local policies. Moreover, 
such results may also enhance theoretical knowledge of punitive practices formulated to 
produce deterrence.  I also endeavor to provide evidence for policymakers’ intentions of 
“attrition through enforcement” (Vaughan 2006) by further exploring the consequences 
of deportation by estimating the effect of the number of removals across local areas. By 
investigating the influence of S-Comm’s implementation and enforcement on the size of 
the U.S. Mexican immigrant population, this paper will present one of the first thorough 
evaluations of the nation’s most prevalent immigration policy, and will also advance our 
limited theoretical knowledge on the effects of hostile contexts and legal compliance 
among undocumented residents.  
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Data & Methods 
Data 
My analysis concentrates on the change in the size of the foreign-born Mexican 
population measured at two time points in order to capture the effects of S-Comm’s 
implementation and enforcement. Estimates from the American Community Survey 
(ACS) were used to provide county-level information on changes in the size of the 
Mexican immigrant population as well as for a variety of socio-demographic variables 
that served as control variables. Literature on the techniques of modeling legal impacts 
recommends comparing jurisdictions before and after the passage of the policy of interest 
in order to achieve valid comparisons of behavioral patterns following the law (Lempert 
1966). Accordingly, I collected ACS estimates at two time points in order to represent 
changes in the population and social conditions associated with the year before S-Comm 
began its implementation (2007), as well as the most recent year for which national ACS 
estimates are available (2011). The final data represents complete information for all 
counties within the contiguous U.S. (N=3,109).   
In order to assess S-Comm’s effects on the size of the Mexican immigrant 
population, I merged the ACS data with information on the dates of each county’s S-
Comm activation as well as its subsequent number of deportations provided by DHS. 
DHS offers annual reports on the number of S-Comm deportations for each county in the 
U.S., and because the population estimates only reflect changes up to 2011, I restricted 
the number of deportations accordingly. Though legal impact studies often suffer the 
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potential of disparate instrumentation4 within data sources (Lempert 1966), both DHS 
and ACS collect, measure, and report their data uniformly which helps to minimize the 
possibility of internal validity threats within my investigation.  
Measures 
 The dependent variable for this analysis is the change in the number of Mexican 
immigrants. It represents in raw change across counties from before DHS began in 
implementation process in 2008 to after the majority of counties across the U.S. had been 
activated in 2011. The key predictor variables include a measure for S-Comm’s 
prioritized implementation as well as a quantification of its enforcement. Prioritization is 
measured as a dichotomous variable; high priority counties are identified as those that 
were activated within the first 18 months of S-Comm’s rollout activation (N=162). Since 
S-Comm has currently achieved full-scale implementation, all other counties, whether or 
not they had activated S-Comm by the end of 2011 received a zero for the binary priority 
variable. Figure 1 displays high and low priority counties consistent with my 
categorizations; Figure 2 available in the appendix illustrates what counties throughout 
the U.S. were activated after 2011.  
                                                 
4 “Changes in the calibration of a measuring instrument or changes in the observers or scores used may 
produce changes in the obtained measurement (Campbell 1957).  
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Figure 1.  
 
Enforcement was captured as a relative measure of the number of S-Comm 
removals that accounts for the risk of and need for deportations within a county. It was 
constructed by dividing the number of reported deportations by the number of years each 
county has respectively had S-Comm by 2011 (zero to three years) to generate the 
number of yearly deportations within each county. The number of yearly deportations 
was then divided the number of Mexican immigrants before S-Comm began its activation 
within each county in order to account for the relative risk and need for enforcement.  
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 Legal impact studies must control for plausible rival factors (Lempert 1966) in 
order to minimize threats of internal validity presented in quasi-experimental designs. 
Accordingly, I control for possible sources of plausible rival hypotheses that may also 
reasonably explain changes in the Mexican immigrant population. Since job opportunities 
and financial incentives have largely predicted the size of immigrant groups across the 
U.S., I control for a variety of economic conditions in order to evaluate whether S-Comm 
has an effect on the number of Mexican immigrants above and beyond expected 
monetary cost-benefits. I control for the changes in unemployment in general, as well as 
changes in opportunities in both the high- and low-skilled labor market. Replicating 
Parrado’s (2013) measures for high- and low-skilled employment, I calculate changes in 
jobs in which Mexican immigrants disproportionately work, as well as jobs that typically 
employ highly educated, non-Latino whites in order to net out changes in job 
opportunities that affect diverse echelons. I therefore include controls for the number of 
people employed in occupations characterized within agriculture, construction, and retail  
(low-skilled employment), as well as those within finance, professional, and public 
administration industries (high-skilled employment). To further test the confounding 
effects of housing availability, I also control for changes in county-level homeownership.   
Analytical Strategy 
Although estimating population change may be performed using a variety of 
statistical techniques, one of the most supported methods for capturing change across two 
waves of data is through a change score (CS) approach. The CS model has been lauded as  
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the preferred approach for measuring the effect of change for non-experimental data 
(Allison 1994) since it avoids biased estimators by excluding the initial level of the 
dependent variable on the right-hand side of the equation while also controlling for all 
unobserved heterogeneity across observations (Allison 1990; 1994).  
Investigating the effects of laws presents a variety of hurdles due to the inability 
to compare behavior patterns in areas had the law of interest never been implemented. 
Furthermore, researchers cannot assign experimental and control groups through a 
random selection process since laws are mandated through legal processes. The time and 
place of a given law’s passage also present risks to legal impact studies due to the 
correlation between laws’ enactments and public attitudes and feelings about a particular 
issue. However, such a selection limitation, considered the most severe threat the legal 
impact studies (Lempert 1966) is largely a non-issue for my examination of S-Comm 
since all jurisdictions across the U.S. were eventually required to activate the partnership 
agreement regardless of local belief systems.  
Each variable in the CS equation represents the difference between values at time 
two and time one. Thus, a CS analysis uncovers the extent to which the predictor 
variable(s) influenced the change in the dependent variable from time one to time two. 
Such models represent a fixed effects assumption and allow account for time-varying 
information. The equation may be expressed as the following:  
Y2 – Y1 = δ1(X1 – X0) + u2 – u1 
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Results 
Descriptive 
I begin by describing the key variables in the study. Table 1 displays the average 
values for the outcome variable, the key predictor variables, as well as the complete set of 
controls. The mean of the outcome variable, change in the size of the Mexican immigrant 
population, shows that the U.S. experienced an average growth of about 106 persons 
from before S-Comm began its activation process to 2011. However, the standard 
deviation of nearly 2,000 persons reflects the extreme variation in the change of foreign-
born Mexican residents experienced across 3,109 counties within the contiguous U.S.   
 26 
 
 
TABLE 1. Descriptive Statistics
Average values for all statistical variables.
High Priority Low Priority Total Counties
Secure Communities Jurisdictions 162 2,947 3,109
Dependent Variables
Change in the Number of Mexican Immigrants 101.3 106.7 106.4
(7,609.0) (554.1) (1,813.9)
Key Predictor Variables
Enforcement 1.5 1.6 1.6
(1.8) (6.7) (6.6)
Yearly Deportations
1
384.4 11.3 30.7
(265.4) (1,071.2) (65.9)
Control Variables
2
Socioeconomic Characteristics
Unemployment 5,698.4 537.4 806.3
(11,090.7) (537.4) (3,289.5)
Homeownership 1,029.3 132.2 178.9
(5,630.3) (1,113.7) (1,690.5)
Low-Skilled Occupations
Agriculture 268.9 15.7 28.9
(635.0) (187.2) (239.3)
Construction -2,167.3 -178.7 -282.3
(4,960.4) (688.6) (1,385.4)
Retail 283.8 3.8 18.4
(1,926.2) (392.8) (585.1)
High-Skilled Occupations
Finance -795.4 -56.7 -95.2
(2,404.3) (470.9) (732.6)
Professional 890.4 86.1 128.0
(1,892.1) (496.7) (671.7)
Public Administration 569.2 57.7 84.3
(1,264.8) (296.9) (406.0)
N  = 3,109
Sources : Information gathered from the Department of Homeland Security and the American Community Survey. 
1
 Only shown here for reference; this variable was not included in subsequent statistical modeling. 
2
 All control variables were specified as the absolute change in the number from before to after S-Comm implementation.
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Surprisingly, the difference in the change in the number of Mexican immigrants 
between high and low priority counties was very marginal on average. High priority 
counties experienced growth of about 101 Mexican immigrant residents on average while 
low priority counties experienced an increase of almost 107 individuals on average from 
prior to post S-Comm activation periods. Such patterns evident in both high and low 
priority counties reflect the overall nationwide trend in the average change in the number 
of local Mexican immigrants. Yet, the seemingly trivial differences in the change in the 
number of foreign-born Mexican residents are masked by this population’s relative 
contribution within local communities. For instance, though an increase of 101 persons 
illustrates only a .24% increase in the number of Mexican immigrants within high priority 
counties, the similar contribution of about 107 persons in low priority areas represents an 
increase of about 7% in the number of foreign-born Mexican residents.5 Evident from the 
Figure 1 and consistent with its prioritized activation, S-Comm was launched in areas 
where Mexican immigrants made up a disproportionate number of residents relative to 
white and citizen inhabitants.  
While the yearly number of deportations was much greater in high than low 
priority areas, the relative level of enforcement, which accounts for the number of at-risk 
Mexican immigrant residents in the denominator of the measure, was quite similar in 
both county categorizations. The standard deviation, however, reveals that low priority 
areas exhibited much greater variability in their levels of enforcement than high priority 
                                                 
5 The average number of foreign-born Mexican residents within high priority counties increased from 
42,025 to 42,127 persons whereas this population grew from 1,521 to 1,628 individuals in low priority 
counties.  
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areas, which only showed a standard deviation of about 1.8 relative to 6.7 in low priority 
counties.  
Indeed, the socio-demographic characteristics across high and low priority 
jurisdictions also showed disparate environments that likely influence migration patterns 
among Mexican immigrant groups. In his examination of 287(g), Parrado (2013) found 
that diminished job opportunities in the low-skill labor market in general, but in the 
construction industry in particular, were highly correlated with attrition in the size and 
growth of the Mexican immigrant population. Consequently, the higher levels in the 
change in unemployment as well as the large reductions in the number of construction-
related jobs found within high relative to low priority areas may drive these counties’ 
potential reductions found in the change in the number of foreign-born Mexican 
residents.  
 29 
 
Regression Results 
S-Comm’s Prioritization Effect 
I employed a CS equation to OLS regression to examine my research queries. 
Table 2 reports the results from the OLS regression of change in the number of Mexican 
immigrants on S-Comm’s implementation and enforcement measures. Column 1 
examines S-Comm’s prioritized implementation process to test whether it’s ethnically  
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targeted rollout pattern led to disparate changes in the Mexican immigrant population 
across high and low priority areas. The results indicate that net of economic and labor 
market conditions, high priority counties experienced a significant growth of over one-
thousand persons on average in the size of their Mexican immigrant population relative to 
low priority jurisdictions. Thus, my expectation to find reductions in the number of 
foreign-born Mexican residents within high relative to low priority counties was not 
supported in my results. In fact, my first model predicted an average increase of about 
2.5% from the initial average population of 42,025 to the predicted size of 43,050. 
Although many of the control variables also displayed significant correlations 
with the change in the number of foreign-born Mexican residents, the values were not 
substantively meaningful. For example, aside from the change in the number of 
agriculture-related jobs, none of the statistically significant control variables exhibited 
coefficients larger than one (person).     
S-Comm’s Enforcement Effect 
Next I aimed to assess the effect of S-Comm’s deportations to test my hypothesis 
predicting that high levels of enforcement would lead to reductions in the number of local 
Mexican immigrant residents. Column 2 illustrates that S-Comm’s level was not 
negatively correlated with growth in the number of Mexican immigrant residents. In fact, 
when controlling for related economic and labor market conditions, S-Comm’s level of 
enforcement was associated with a trivial growth in the number of foreign-born Mexican 
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residents within a county, but this relationship was non-significant. The control variables 
operated in the same direction and to the same extent as Column 1.  
S-Comm’s Effects: Implementation or Enforcement 
 Following my next research question, I tested whether deportation enforcement 
exhibited a greater influence on the size of local foreign-born Mexican residents within a 
county than mere high priority activation as I anticipated. My findings, however, suggest 
a different scenario. Not only does Column 3 show that S-Comm’s level of enforcement 
was not significantly negatively correlated with the change in the number of local 
Mexican immigrants, but enforcement demonstrated a much smaller effect on this 
population’s change relative to S-Comm’s prioritization activation process. Although the 
predicted number of foreign-born Mexican residents was reduced when controlling for 
enforcement, the results from Column 3 largely reflect those found in Column 1. 
Controlling for economic and labor market characteristics as well as S-Comm’s level of 
enforcement, high priority implementation was associated with a growth in the Mexican 
immigrant population by about one-thousand persons on average relative to low priority 
counties. The growth predicted in Column 3 reflects a 2.4% increase from 42,025 to 
43,036 Mexican immigrants residing in high priority counties on average—a .01% 
decrease from the values predicted in Column 1. Again, the control variables operated in 
the same direction and to the same extent as column 1. 
S-Comm’s Dual Implementation & Enforcement Effects 
 Lastly, I expected that highly prioritized and enforced areas would demonstrate  
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the largest reductions in the size of their Mexican immigrant population relative to low 
priority and lesser enforcing counties. I tested my expectations by integrating an 
interaction effect between S-Comm’s prioritization and its level of enforcement. The 
results in Column 4 continue to express similar results from the previous models among 
all variables. In accordance with my hypothesis, however, the interaction between S-
Comm’s prioritization and enforcement effects demonstrated attrition in the number of 
Mexican immigrants. Controlling for economic conditions, labor market opportunities, as 
well as the main effects of high priority and enforcement, the interaction variable 
predicted a decrease of over 130 foreign-born Mexican residents within highly prioritized 
and greatly enforcing areas relative to low prioritization and enforcement counties. 
Although this finding is consistent with my hypothesis, the result is not statistically 
significant.  
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Discussion & Conclusion 
Investigating S-Comm’s influence on the size of the Mexican immigrant 
population involved synching information provided by DHS and the ACS. After 
collecting county-level measures of the change in the size of the Mexican immigrant 
population, along with corresponding socio-demographic variables typically associated 
with changes in immigrant populations, I matched such estimates to the respective 
county-level S-Comm information on the date of activation and the subsequent number of 
removals. In doing so, I created a comprehensive dataset to assess whether S-Comm’s 
implementation and enforcement were independently and collectively associated with 
changes in the number of county-level Mexican immigrant residents.  
 Applying CS techniques with OLS regression, my analysis reveals that S-Comm’s 
implementation was associated with an increase of over 1,000 local Mexican immigrant 
residents within high relative to low priority counties. S-Comm’s level of enforcement 
was also positively associated with the number of Mexican immigrants, but such results 
were not statistically significant. Moreover, the relationship between enforcement and the 
change in the size of the foreign-born Mexican population was neither substantively 
salient, since the coefficient—reflecting the number of persons—was less than one. The 
results for S-Comm’s prioritized implementation remained significant and similar in size 
(from 1,024.3 to 1,010.8) when the level of enforcement was controlled for in the model, 
and enforcement displayed a relatively unwavering coefficient, as well. Consistent with 
previous studies on whether local immigration policy effectively reduced the size of the 
nation’s unauthorized population (Bean, et al. 1990; Kossoudji 1992; Espenshade 1994; 
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1995; Cornelius & Salehyan 2007; Parrado 2013; Ryo 2013), my results indicate that 
neither implementation nor enforcement have independently led to attrition in the number 
of Mexican immigrant residents.  
Accounting for the potential unique climate associated with highly prioritized and 
enforced areas, I tested whether the interaction of my key predictor variables produced a 
significant relationship with the change in the number of local Mexican immigrants. 
While my previous hypotheses were not supported by my results, the interaction between 
high priority counties and enforcement displayed a negative association with the change 
in the size of the foreign-born Mexican population. High priority counties that actively 
enforced deportation experienced a reduction of about 131.4 persons on average relative 
to low priority counties and those areas that did not employ great levels of enforcement. 
However, the interaction effect was not significant when I accounted for robust standard 
errors. While such results indicate a successful model for producing attrition, my findings 
largely suggest that S-Comm does not achieve its intention of reducing the overall 
unauthorized resident population living in the U.S. as demonstrated through the 
prevalence of Mexican immigrants.  
Limitations 
Though I employed CS techniques to assess change across two periods of time 
and, my study—like much research interested in uncovering the impacts of laws—faces 
substantive and design challenges. Alternative ways to achieve a legal impact study 
involves the comparison of jurisdictions that mirror each other to the extent that  
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behaviors exhibited in the two sets of jurisdictions would have been the same had the 
areas not different with respect to the passage of a particular law (Lempert 1966).  Thus, 
future analysis may consider dropping prioritized counties altogether since such areas 
indeed represent categorically unique population proportions as well as S-Comm 
procedures. Indeed, the disparate selection of areas for a comparison group poses a 
hazard for legal impact studies’ internal validity (Campbell 1957). To avoid a selection 
bias potentially caused by including high priority areas, another method to achieve 
comparisons across jurisdictions should designate counties chosen for S-Comm 
activation in 2010 as the treatment group and those counties that received S-Comm in 
2012 henceforth as the control group. This design would further minimize plausible rival 
hypotheses that threaten legal impact studies’ validity (Lempert 1966).  
Policy Implications 
Although originally touted as an effort to enhance public safety by prioritizing the 
removal of “criminal aliens,” S-Comm’s activation process has been found to ethnically 
target Latino residents rather than areas with high rates of crime (Cox & Miles 2013) and 
its enforcement procedures and restated intentions reveal that the policy casts a much 
wider net on detecting unauthorized residents to deport. Utilizing a deterrence 
framework, S-Comm seeks to achieve ‘attrition through enforcement’ in the nation’s 
undocumented immigrant population. Consistent with previous studies on deterrent 
models and increased punitive measures and barriers to stem unauthorized migration 
(Bean, et al. 1990; Kossoudji 1992; Espenshade 1994; 1995; Cornelius & Salehyan 2007; 
Parrado 2013; Ryo 2013), my results indicate that S-Comm has been ineffective in its 
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efforts to reduce in the number of foreign-born Mexican immigrants with potential costly 
consequences for legal compliance.  
Prior research on the effects of racial profiling practices among the police suggest 
that such policing practices lead to negative views of enforcement officers as well as the 
law more generally—leading to increased propensities toward criminality among targeted 
racial and ethnic groups (Tyler 2002). Individuals may even cultivate such beliefs, 
attitudes, and behaviors without direct negative interaction with police if their community 
is characterized by legal cynicism (Kirk & Papachristos 2011). Such theoretical 
paradigms thus highlight the probability for Mexican immigrants to defy S-Comm due to 
the disparate attention and treatment they receive through the policy’s implementation 
(Cox & Miles 2013) and enforcement (Lopez, et al. 2011).  Moreover, evidence from 
Ryo’s (2013) study likewise discourages enforcement that may lead to negative views of 
the U.S. immigration system.  
Though I hypothesized that Mexican immigrants would respond to such harsh 
conduct by relocating away from areas where they may feel most scrutinized and 
shadowed, my results indicate behaviors consistent with ‘trust in the law’ and legal 
cynicism literature. My research also lends support for non-deterrent strategies in 
immigration policy design, consistent recent findings that found no significant 
relationship between unauthorized individuals’ intent to migrate and their perceived risks 
or severity of sanctions related to their unauthorized migration (Ryo 2013). By revealing 
S-Comm’s implementation and enforcement effects on the change in the size of the 
Mexican immigrant population, my analysis offers unique information for theoretical 
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models explaining legal compliance, as well as offer salient evidence for policy to evade 
deterrent models when seeking to attenuate unauthorized migration.  
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Appendix 
 
Figure 2.  
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